Archive for the 'Semi-coherent Rambling' Category

Dec 26th 2008 Our Own Worst Enemy

How do you turn a supertanker?  According to justanswer.com, the technique for turning a loaded supertanker involves shutting down the main engines 25 kilometers (about 15 miles) before reaching the actual turning point.  This is because the huge vehicle has so much momentum that it takes that long just to slow down to turning speed.  Of course it also takes 25 kilometers or more to get up to cruising speed.  But what if the various parts of the supertanker are travelling at different speeds or – shudder – even in different directions?  Well then you’d be looking at the U.S. economic bureaucracy at work.  Because when it comes to efficiently running this economy, we are often our own worst enemy.

 Look at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the two federally chartered purchasers of home mortgages taken under government conservatorship last summer.  The reason Fannie and Freddie were taken over by the government is that they were suspected of having too little capital to cover the potential demands made on the two companies as hundreds of thousands of mortgages failed or might fail.  The worry was that lax lending policies n the part of mortgage lenders and equally lax oversight on the part of Fannie and Freddie had placed the organizations in peril.  And then there’s the mark-to-market rule that forced the companies to write down billions in mortgages that weren’t in arrears but MIGHT HAVE BECOME SO.  Mark-to-market, which has since been conveniently suspended, was the neutron bomb of home finance regulation, intended solely to destroy the value of mortgages and lenders without any other impact or, frankly, without even logical reason.

 So Fannie and Freddie made some mistakes, the rules were changed under them, they went from fat to flat almost overnight, and the feds in their infinite wisdom took over.

 Now the game changes again.  Under federal conservatorship Fannie and Freddie suddenly had unlimited borrowing power with the Fed.  They could buy mortgages like crazy with little thought to whether or not doing so would be profitable.  Heck, their common shareholders were already figuring to have lost 100 percent of their investment.  At this point Fannie and Freddie were simply tools for government management of the economy, their goal being to make more and easier lending.  Yes, this is the exact opposite of what the government might have demanded six months earlier, but in the new reality it is what Fannie and Freddie were supposed to do.

 But of course they didn’t.

 When mark-to-market came on the horizon both companies started to cut back on purchasing loans and securitizing them, trying to reduce their exposure.  And even though it was the government’s policy that these activities expand, they contracted and continued to contract, instead.

 Why?  Because that’s how it is turning a supertanker.

 Where one might have expected the good men and women of Fannie and Freddie would go in the very next day after being put under conservatorship and start buying mortgages right and left they did just the opposite.  And as of December 1st they raised their requirements for mortgages both companies would buy making sure that they’d buy fewer and fewer, rejecting especially the most troubled loans that in the current climate probably most need to be purchased.

 This is, of course, insane.  But it is also the way bureaucracies work.  The new Fannie/Freddie qualification guidelines were announced in August to be applied December 1.  To have been announced in August they had to have been written in March – eight months before going into effect.  THAT’S how long it takes to turn THIS supertanker even a little.

 The new qualifi9cation guidelines went into effect December 1 even though everyone at Fannie and Freddie knew three months before that the new guidelines were contrary to the new policy of both organizations. 

 So they’ll get reversed, right, just like mark-to-market was? Maybe.  Mark-to-market was a hypersonic reversal in terms of financial regulations.  Don’t expect Fannie or Freddie to be nearly so nimble.  Right now it is suddenly becoming clear to the incoming Obama administration that these new rules don’t make any sense.  So they’ll move to change them absolutely as soon as possible.

 Eight months from now.

 

 

4 Comments » Posted by cringely / Semi-coherent Rambling

Nov 3rd 2008 What if Phil Gramm was Right?

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Naomi Klein on the Global Financial Crisis

4 Comments » Posted by cringely / Semi-coherent Rambling

Nov 3rd 2008 Performance Anxiety: Did all those banks HAVE to fail?

So we’re in this terrible economy, banks are shutting down or being taken-over all over the country, and it’s because people aren’t paying their mortgages, right?

 

Wrong.  Only about 5-7 percent of mortgage holders right now have stopped paying.

 

While about three times as many homes are going into foreclosure these days than is the historic norm, such levels aren’t themselves capable of sending the banking sector into such a tizzy.  No, it required the double whammy of a change in accounting standards (called mark-to-market) followed almost instantly by the brutal application of those new standards, after which the standards were then relaxed again after some firms died as a result. Think of it as a financial neutron bomb killing only the banks but not their deposits. It sounds like yet another scam to me.

 

Here’s how it works.  Under Generally Accepted Accounting Procedures (GAAP) the issue is how lenders (mainly banks) value the loans on their books. Apparently there was an accounting rules change not long ago that forced them to value the loans moe conservatively, valuing them at what they could be sold for that day in the current market (marking to market).  This change forced writedowns of subprime and alt-a loans resulting in big paper losses for the banks which put them in positions of having inadequate liquidity (not enough deposits backing the loans).  The banks were then insolvent, had to raise capital, couldn’t raise capital and failed or were taken over.

 

Now here’s the key point that I think is being missed.  The accounting rule change forced loan values to be marked-down severely while at the same time MOST MORTGAGE HOLDERS WERE CONTINUING TO MAKE THEIR PAYMENTS ON TIME.  Right now only 5-7 percent of subprime borrowers are in arrears yet the value of their loans have been marked down 60-70 percent.  There’s a disconnect here.  The write-downs are far in excess of what is justified on the basis of loan performance.

 

Was this crisis precipitated, then, by an accounting change?  Sure there’s a lot of bad lending going on, but most borrowers are still paying their bills.  IndyMac, CountryWide, WAMU and others failed for precisely this reason, yet now that they are gone the rules has been eased.

 

I think the rule was bad in the first place and while those banks might have failed anyway, they shouldn’t have failed for this specific reason.

1 Comment » Posted by cringely / Semi-coherent Rambling

Nov 3rd 2008 Where did this mortgage crisis come from, anyway? Part 1

This is the first of a zillion-part thread on how the heck we got into this financial mess in the first place.  With reader feedback and a lot more reading I’m sure I’ll get close to the real reason, but you have to start somewhere, why not here?

My young and lovely wife, showing what might be overoptimism or maybe artful timing given the economy but more likely just general disappointment with me, has decided to embark on a career in real estate sales. She has taken classes and passed tests, joined one of the very best local firms, and hurled herself into the business of selling historic Charleston homes while they still have some value and the termites haven’t finished their work. And along the way, while mastering the Multiple Listing Service, she learned an important fact that was news to us both: people no longer find houses for sale by looking in the local newspaper. They use the Internet, instead.

The irony here is that — at least in these parts — the local paper seems chock-full of real estate ads. But according to her teachers down at the MLS university, those listings are simply vestigial, like little toes we all have but probably don’t need for balance or, indeed, for anything at all. Real estate brokers put ads in local newspapers because their customers expect them to do so, not because they actually help sell houses.

I’m sure there are exceptions to this rule, but if 80 percent of all houses for sale in the U.S. are eventually sold NOT because of any newspaper listing, tradition or professional pride aside, at some point we can expect real estate newspaper advertising to eventually disappear. Chock up more bad karma for the newspaper industry, where this fact has to have been long known, and which is apparently in even worse trouble than we thought.

But this post isn’t about the newspaper industry or even about the real estate industry. It is about the lack of friction in our commercial lives brought about by the Internet and an emerging thought in my mind that maybe it is time we as a people took action to change some things.

Let me explain.

It’s not that newspaper ads work so poorly for selling real estate, it’s that Internet advertising works so well. You can put more words on a web ad than you could ever put in the newspaper for the same money. You can put more and bigger pictures, virtual tours, Google maps. You can put Zillow virtual appraisals and links to lenders, home inspectors, and the local Chamber of Commerce. Internet house listings can be searched in a zillion ways that newspaper listings cannot. In the time it takes to find a house — any house, maybe even the wrong house — in the newspaper and then go see it, well in that amount of time using the Internet you can find the house, order an inspection, get a loan, and make an offer on the darned thing. It’s like crossing house-hunting with air hockey.

But is it all good?

Don’t tell George W. Bush, but we are in a recession, which is making me look more critically at the Internet as a marketplace. There’s a lot of good about the Internet market, of course. Auction sites like eBay help us get rid of our junk and then help us replace it with new junk. The web has made comparison-shopping for houses and cars and disposable diapers almost a contact sport. And we’re sure as heck better equipped than we were before to claim all that money that’s been waiting for us with some bank manager in Nigeria.

Just as an aside, I know a guy from Japan who actually went to Nigeria once to pick up some of that unclaimed money. It didn’t exist and he felt lucky to get home at all.

The theme of disintermediation — of eliminating middlemen — has been a driving force in the Internet for as long as commerce has been allowed on the web. But what happens when the middleman you just eliminated had as one of his or her jobs the task of keeping us from being ripped off?

Tasks that are harder to accomplish are also less likely to be foolishly accomplished, which is why so few of us make trips to Nigeria.

That’s not the way we are supposed to view things, of course. Ideally the Internet as a research tool is supposed to give us all the information we need in order to resist any allure the Internet has as a tool of fraud or misadventure. But this attitude ignores many of the fundamental forces at work in most sales situations where the simple fact is that we want to buy, the seller wants to sell, and so any countervailing forces are purely voluntary, which is to say often nonexistent.

Take our current national economic mess, the so-called sub-prime mortgage crisis. I like to think that I’m not a subprime kind of guy, but pretending to work as I do (my kids think I TYPE for a living) the world may not always see me the way I would like to be seen. So last year, in what we didn’t know were the waning and idyllic pre-subprime days, I tried to get a new mortgage. Of course I used the Internet to get the loan because, as we all know, when banks compete I win. And within a few days, without having to actually meet with or even speak to another human, I found myself offered a $336,000 mortgage.

It was SO easy. Fill out a few online forms, make some choices, and there I was, about to close that loan. But then I did an odd thing. I carefully read the papers I was about to sign (I’m one of THOSE people). And in that residential loan application, right on line something or other, was a number that didn’t make any sense to me at all. It was labeled “total household income” and was almost twice the pitiful amount I actually earn.

From where did that number come? It certainly never came from me. Since my signature would be at the bottom of this application I wanted to make sure everything was correct, so I called the mortgage broker. For the first time we spoke. She was a very nice lady, too, and explained that number was the variable required for all the ratios to be correct so I could qualify for the loan.

“But it isn’t true,” I said.

“Do you want the loan or not?” she asked.

Not.

I wasn’t so principled as cowardly, but maybe that doesn’t matter: I did what I knew was the right thing for me, which was to walk away from the loan. But evidently a lot of other people took the other course and today are having trouble paying for their houses, which is a big part of the reason why we are in this current economic mess.

This little drama of mine explains the credit crunch better than Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke ever would. Securitization of mortgages works just fine unless the mortgages are based on lies. Lenders turned a blind eye to bad loans and bad loan candidates because another company assumed the risk by bundling these loans and reselling them on a global market.

What has caused the credit problems to extend beyond subprime borrowers to just about everyone is the simple fact that lenders can’t act so sloppily now, but having turned that blind eye for so many years they have no idea who is telling the truth anymore. So they don’t trust anyone.

And that brings me back to transparency and disintermediation and why the heck the Internet, which was very involved in enabling a lot of this bad behavior, didn’t do even the smallest thing to help save us from ourselves?

I suppose it was because there is no money in virtue, no easily measurable value in NOT having those banks compete so I could win only to eventually lose.

Do these loan referral outfits like LendingTree and LowerMyBills and the many, many others EVER say, “Wait a minute, pardner, there’s no way you can qualify for any loan, much less that no-doc super-jumbo you have your eye on?”

No.

In their defense, these companies are never actually faced with that question, which is ultimately asked not of them but of their customers, the lenders, and we know how much self-restraint those people have: almost none.

Here’s why I bring this up. It is clear to me that government (ANY government, not just the U.S. federal government) and Wall Street have no idea whatsoever how to handle the current crisis. They are just trying to look busy while protecting their own interests and allowing those affected to muddle our way through this mess to some kind of solution. It’s not that they don’t want to be helpful (if the cost of being helpful is low enough) but that they simply don’t know HOW to be helpful. They can’t be educated and they can’t be changed. Certainly they wouldn’t consider any course that would curtail government authority or commercial opportunity.

So I figure we’re on our own. And if we are really, truly on our own, we shouldn’t pretend that we’re not, that some agency that doesn’t know its IP address from a hole in the ground will take care of us and make this all better. If we’re on our own we should solve our own problems using the tools at our disposal. Which brings me back to the Internet, where it ought to be possible for a change to use all that transparency and economic friction reduction to actually do something FOR us, rather than something TO us.

3 Comments » Posted by cringely / Semi-coherent Rambling

Nov 1st 2008 ARMs and the Man

       My mortgage is a 5/1 ARM, which is a type of Adjustable Rate Mortgage where the interest rate is fixed for the first five years then can adjust once each year thereafter.  I got the mortgage when I bought my house in July 2004.  My initial interest rate was 5.375 percent, but the five year anniversary is coming in July of 2009 and that’s what has me worried.  Now that my WAMU mortgage is going to be owned by JP Morgan Chase, are they going to adjust my rate so high that I can’t afford the monthly payment?  Probably not.  But my mortgage is a jumbo (bigger than the FHA would touch under the old rules) and nobody seems to be approving jumbo mortgages these days, so I am feeling vulnerable.

       Ironically, I might have been better off with a worse loan.  You see my mortgage isn’t technically sub-prime OR Alt-A, the two nefarious loan classifications where homes seem to be foreclosing at a furious rate.  JP Morgan Chase just announced a program to convert THOSE loans to fixed-rate with lower payments.  But not mine.  Bummer.

       Right now, by the rules of my loan, I should just sit tight and let it readjust.  And that’s what I’ll do except I just don’t trust the lender.  I know that if any mortgage can get screwed-up it will be MY mortgage.  So that’s why I need to learn all I can to be ready to refinance BEFORE the reset in July, just in case.

1 Comment » Posted by cringely / Semi-coherent Rambling

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